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Abstract
Digital contact tracing is one of the actions useful, in combination with
other measures, to manage an epidemic diffusion of an infection disease
in an after-lock-down phase. This is a very timely issue, due to the pan-
demic of COVID-19 we are unfortunately living. Apps for contact tracing
aim to detect proximity of users and to evaluate the related risk in terms
of possible contagious. Existing approaches leverage Bluetooth or GPS,
or their combination, even though the prevailing approach is Bluetooth-
based and relies on a decentralized model requiring the mutual exchange
of ephemeral identifiers among users’ smartphones. Unfortunately, a num-
ber of security and privacy concerns exist in this kind of solutions, mainly
due to the exchange of identifiers, while GPS-based solutions (inherently
centralized) may suffer from threats concerning massive surveillance. In
this paper, we propose a solution leveraging GPS to detect proximity,
and Bluetooth only to improve accuracy, without enabling exchange of
identifiers. Unlike related existing solutions, no complex cryptographic
mechanism is adopted, while ensuring that the server does not learn any-
thing about locations of users.
Keywords— Digital contact tracing, Pandemic, COVID-19, Health informatics
1 INTRODUCTION
The epidemic diffusion of an infection disease can be contrasted by adopting various
actions, suitably combined each other, like tests, pharmacological treatments, quar-
antine, contact tracing. The latter consists in identifying the maximum number of
persons potentially infected by a given patient detected as positive to the infection, in
a suitable contagious temporal (past) window. Which kind of contact makes a person
potentially infected and how long the contagious window is, strictly depend on the
type of infection. The pandemic of COVID-2019 we are leaving in this period is char-
acterized by high contagiousness mainly due to asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic
infections, during a large temporal window (at least 14 days) [1]. Therefore, tradi-
tional contact tracing based on human intelligence activities to identify contacts is
not sufficient if not supported by digital solutions able to capture even short (numer-
ous) contacts occurred during the activities of daily life [2]. For this reason, there is
nowadays a great attention towards digital contact tracing that many countries in the
world are adopting through mobile apps to better manage the after-lock-down phase.
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Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) [3] on board of smartphones is the technology used
to implement decentralized protocols, in which users in BLE action range exchange
pseudonym identities and store them together with some information useful to eval-
uate the risk of the occurred contacts in terms of possible contagious. The DP-3T
based solutions [4, 5] fall in the above category and certainly represent the prevail-
ing approach in this moment, recognized as the approach that best protects citizens’
privacy.
However, DP-3T is not immune from threats to privacy and to the integrity of the
protocol, also due to some technological issues related to its Bluetooth-based imple-
mentation [6, 7, 8].
On the other hand, centralized solutions are often based on GPS. The basic way
to implement a GPS-based solution requires that the user’s absolute position is peri-
odically transmitted to a server (under the control of the government), which is then
able to maintain the graph of contacts, possibly in form of pseudonyms. One of the
advantages of the centralized model is that identities are not exchanged among users,
and this disarm a number of possible issues arising from the possible misbehaviour of
users. However, as recently stated by EU [9], GPS-based solutions introduce intoler-
able risks threatening fundamental rights of people, if implemented as above, in the
general case that the server cannot be assumed fully trusted and positions of user are
stored or potentially inferred.
On the other hand, more sophisticated approaches relying on GPS exist, which,
thanks to multi party computation and other complex cryptographic mechanisms, are
able to effectively contrast the issues arising from non-trusted servers [10, 11]. However,
these solutions are not scalable [12], due to the computational overhead required by
cryptographic protocols.
In this paper, we propose a solution, called Zero Ephemeral Exchanging-Privacy-
Preserving-Proximity Tracing (ZE2-P3T, for short), relying on GPS to detect prox-
imity, and on Bluetooth (BLE) only to improve accuracy. Our solution overcomes
the most security and privacy issues of the DP-3T approach, basically because the
exchange of identifiers is not enabled. Interestingly, unlike related existing solutions,
to ensure that the server does not learn anything about locations of users, no com-
plex cryptographic mechanism is adopted, making our solution feasible also for a large
number of users.
The structure of this paper is the following. In Section 2, the related literature
is analysed. Section 3 describe the state-of-the-art decentralized protocol DP-3T is
described and the motivation of our study. In Section 4, we present ZE2-P3T, a new
solution which does not require the exchange of identifiers between the users. ZE2-
PT3 uses a protocol called PNP, described in Section 5, to improve the accuracy of the
GPS localization. The security analysis is discussed in Section 6. Finally, in Section
7, we draw our conclusions.
2 RELATED WORK
The COVID-19 pandemic certainly represents one of the most difficult challenges that
modern society has ever faced. To counter and slow down the spread of the virus, new
ways, new strategies, and solutions are being sought every day, in every sector, from
the economic to the medical, from the political to the technological. Precisely in this
latter field, researchers from all over the world are investing their energies to propose,
as quickly as possible, digital solutions for tracking contacts that preserve privacy and
that comply with current regulations.
Many solutions decide upon for a Bluetooth-based approach. Several solutions opt
for a decentralized approach (such as DP-3T and the Apple and Google Exposure No-
tification System) [6] to guarantee high privacy properties. Among the decentralized
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models, the emerging model is certainly the Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Prox-
imity Tracing (DP-3T) [4] and, therefore, the DP-3T based solutions. This model
is based on ephemeral pseudonyms (called EphID) sent via Bluetooth Low Energy
(BLE) which are registered by nearby users. We will see more carefully this model
in the next section. In the spirit of collaboration, Google and Apple announced a
joint effort for a new Bluetooth protocol that preserves privacy to support Exposure
Notification [5] and which will follow the DP-3T principles. Avitabile et al. [6] un-
veiled Pronto-C2, a decentralized tracking system that is based on BLE and appears
to be more resistant than DP-3T against mass surveillance attacks. This system can
be implemented through government servers but it can also be completely decentral-
ized by using blockchain technology. CAUDHT is a decentralized system based on
Distributed Hash Tables [13]. The entities involved are users, a distributed hash table
(DHT), and the Health Authority (HA), which has the role of confirmation of positive
cases. Another decentralized protocol based on Bluetooth is TCN (Temporary Con-
tact Numbers) [14]. To solve the problem of scalability, the protocol switches from
purely random TCNs to TCNs generated deterministically from some seed data. The
price it pays for greater scalability is a reduction in privacy because the TCNs derived
from the same report can be linked together.
Other solutions choose a centralized approach [6] such as NTK and ROBERT which
have been developed inside the Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing
(PEPP-PT) [15]. Centralization has the advantage of providing epidemiologists with
more useful data, thus allowing more effective actions to be taken to defeat the virus,
but some scholars fear that these systems could become a more intrusive massive
surveillance tool for governments [8]. PEPP-PT NTK is a proximity tracing system,
based on Bluetooth Low Energy [16]. Just like DP-3T, NTK and ROBERT are based
on ephemeral pseudonyms sent via BLE that are registered by nearby users, with the
difference that the secret keys for calculating EphIDs are created and managed by
a back-end server and not from the user’s phone [17]. Moreover, DP-3T, NTK, and
ROBERT require a central backend for their operation in which epidemiological data is
stored. The Altuwaiyan et al. model, called EPIC, [18] is always based on Bluetooth
technology, and offers a fine-grained human-to-human contact tracing scheme with
hybrid wireless and localization technology. EPIC introduces a matching method
which uses homomorphic encryption to match common wireless devices between the
infected and the regular user. However, the system can suffer from serious privacy
losses and above all, it has scalability problems [12].
TraceTogether, implemented in Singapore, was the first centralized Bluetooth-
based solution [19]. This approach involves two types of entities namely the Ministry
of Health (MoH), which all users are assumed to trust, and users (who are not required
to share everything with MoH if they have not been in close contact with a confirmed
positive). This system manages to trace the COVID-19 transmission graph in the
population that installed the app. However, solutions based on Bluetooth technology
present several vulnerabilities [20] and have a slow and low adoption rate which there-
fore limits the user base adhering to the system [12]. Furthermore, these systems only
consider the human-to-human interaction and therefore do not allow us to discover
the place where an outbreak has developed as it is not possible to know the user’s
position. The side effect is that such solutions ignore the fact that the COVID-19 can
also be transmitted through common environments or commonly touched surfaces [21]
(indirect contacts). Obviously, to know the location of a user would have an intolerable
price in terms of privacy.
However, trickier approaches relying on GPS localization exist, which are able
to mitigate the privacy issues mentioned above. Berke et al. [11] propose a GPS-
based solution that takes advantage of the partitioning of fine-grained GPS positions
and private set intersection that allows the system to detect when a user approached
positive patients. Reichert et al. [10] offer a solution on how to make contact tracking
3
centralized based on GPS data to preserve user privacy. The system uses a central
party (HA) and applies multi-party computation (MPC) on the real-world problem of
centralized contact trace.
However, these solutions are not scalable [12], due to the computational overhead
required by the adopted cryptographic protocols (i.e., MPC).
Our solution starts from the above reference framework, with the aim to over-
come the privacy issues of decentralized solutions, on the one hand, and the scalability
problems of centralized (absolute-position based) approaches, on the other hand. Our
approach is centralized and is based on privacy-preserving absolute position detec-
tion. The position is obtained by using GPS, in combination with BLE and the Earth
magnetic field for the indoor environments. This choice is supported by results avail-
able in the literature like [22], which presents a system able to guarantee a maximum
positioning error of less than 10 cm in an internal environment.
3 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATIONS
As mentioned in the previous section, the DP-3T protocol [4] represents at moment
the prevailing approach especially in European Union. Despite the fact that DP-
3T, similarly to TCN [14], suffers from some serious drawbacks concerning users’
privacy, it is the reference approach because is the state-of-the-art implementation of
the decentralized model, which is preferred to the centralized model.
It is then important to describe into detail how DP-3T solutions work. The basic
idea is to install an app on each smartphone and to use Bluetooth to interact with
other nearby smartphones to register the contacts. Therefore, the actors of the DP-3T
system are:
• The users in possession of a communication device (a smartphone equipped with
Bluetooth running the DP-3T app).
• The back-end server, which acts exclusively as a communication platform and
does not perform any processing. Moreover, the privacy of users in the system
does not depend on the actions of this server.
• The health authority, which is responsible for informing patients of the positive
test results, allows uploads from phones to the back-end and determines the
contagious window.
The app broadcasts an ephemeral pseudo-random ID that represents the user and also
records pseudo-random IDs observed by smartphones in the immediate proximity. If a
user finds out that she/he is positive for COVID-19 then, after obtaining the approval
of the health authority, may upload some anonymous data from her/his smartphone
to a central server. Before uploading, all data remains exclusively on the user’s smart-
phone. The DP-3T model provides two decentralized proximity tracing designs: the
first, defined as low-cost, is a lightweight system at the cost of limited tracing of in-
fected patients, the second, defined as unlinkable, offers extra privacy properties with
a small increase in bandwidth. The first solution reveals minimal information to the
back-end server. Each smartphone generates an initial random initial daily key SKt
for the current day t and, every day rotates the secret day key SKt by calculating
SKt = H(SKt−1), where H is a cryptographic hash function. Each smartphone uses
the secret key SKt during the day t to locally generate a list of ephemeral identifiers
(EphID)s that change frequently (every epoch with length l). Therefore, at the be-
ginning of each day t, each smartphone generates locally a list of n = (24 · 60)/l new
EphIDis to be transmitted during the day t. Given the secret day key SKt, each de-
vice calculates EphID1||...||EphIDn = PRG(PRF (SKt, broadcastkey)), where PRG
is a stream cipher, PRF is a pseudo-random function, and broadcast key is a fixed
and public string. The EphIDis are transmitted in random order and each EphID
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is transmitted for l minutes. The EphIDs are broadcasted via Bluetooth Low En-
ergy announcements (the system relies on BLE beacons, whose payload is of 16 bytes,
which technically limits the size of the EphIDs). These EphIDs are then locally
stored (together with the corresponding proximity, the duration and an approximate
indication of the time) by the other nearby smartphones. Each smartphone stores the
SK keys it has generated in the last 14 days and the same happens for all the data and
the EphIDs observed and generated. A user who tested positive, only after obtaining
authorization from the health authority, may send to the back-end the key SKt and
the day t corresponding to the first day on which it was considered contagious. The
back-end collects the pairs (SKt, t) of the infected patients and periodically sends
them to all the other smartphones in the system. Given the key SKt, everyone can
calculate all the ephemeral identifiers EphIDs used by the infected patient starting
from the corresponding day t. The device determines the owner’s risk score using the
risk-scoring algorithm with its local records corresponding to the infectious EphID.
The second solution, defined as unlinkable, offers better privacy properties at the
cost of a greater volume of downloads and storage space required by the smartphone.
The ephemeral identifiers of positive individuals are hashed and stored in a Cuckoo
filter [23], which is distributed to the users of the system. The smartphone draws a
random 32-byte per-epoch seed (seedi) and generate the ephemeral Bluetooth identifier
EphIDi for each epoch i: EphIDi = TRUNCATE128(H(seedi)), where H is a
cryptographic hash function, and TRUNCATE128 truncates the output to 128 bits.
Smartphones store the seeds corresponding to all past epochs in the last 14 days.
For each observed EphID, the smartphone stores the hashed string H(EphID||i),
the proximity, the duration, and an approximate indication of the time. Unlike the
previous solution, when a user tested positive, she/he can choose the set of epochs
I for which she/he wants to reveal her/his identifiers, that is, she/he can selectively
decide which identifiers she/he wants to communicate to the server. After making this
decision, the smartphone loads the set of pairs (i, seedi). Periodically, the back-end
creates a new Cuckoo filter F and, for each pair (i, seedi) loaded by an infected user,
inserts H(TRUNCATE128(H(seedi))||i) into the Cuckoo filter F and sends this filter
to all the smartphones in the system. Each smartphone uses this filter to determine
whether the user has been in contact with an infected person.
DP-3T suffers from several attacks that can compromise user privacy and poten-
tially lead to undergo undetectable mass surveillance attacks [6]. Some attacks may
have the purpose of building a mass surveillance infrastructure to track citizens both
in the case of trusted servers and in the case of colluding server (Paparazzi and Orwell
attack, respectively). Another attack could aim to create a mapping between a user’s
real identity and her/his pseudonym (Brutus Attack). Another goal of an attack is
to produce plausible digital evidence of an encounter with an infected user (Gossip
Attack). An attacker could also produce false alarms so that non-at-risk user is mis-
takenly alerted and declared positive (Matteotti Attack). The attacks mentioned here
will be thoroughly described in Section 6, but we introduce this issue here because it
is the consideration from which we start as a motivation of our paper. In fact, our
paper tries to offer a new declination of the centralized model overcoming the security
and privacy drawbacks of DP-3T, without introducing risks usually associated with
centralized digital contact tracing at feasible computational cost for the server.
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Figure 1: Coverage of microcells
4 THE ZERO EPHEMERAL EXCHANGING-
PRIVACY-PRESERVING-PROXIMITY SO-
LUTION
In this section, we describe ZE2-P3T, which is the solution we propose for proximity
tracing not relying on the exchange of ephemeral identifiers like the state-of-the-art
solutions.
We refer to a large geographic area A representing, for example, a country. In our
model, A contains several microcells ci such that
• They cover all the area A
• If the distance between two users Ux and Uy is less than a threshold parameter
d, it exists a microcell which contains both Ux and Uy.
Microcells are squares of side 2d organized as in Figure 1.
Therein, we use different colours to better highlight the different microcells (13 in
total). It easy to see that a user is always, simultaneously, in two different microcells
and that two users positioned closest than the distance d each other have a microcell
in common. For example, in the figure, the user Ux is in the blue and green microcells
while the user Uy is in the red and green microcells.
With each microcell ci, we associate a point Ci called centroid corresponding to the
centre of the square. The set of all the centroids is public and each user, through the
combination of GPS and magnetic position systems [22], for indoor positions, is able
to identify the centroids associated with the two microcells where the user is located.
The exact utilization of magnetic positioning is out of the scope of this paper, even
though the state-of-the-art technologies can be directly used for our purpose. From
now on, for simplicity, we refer only to the GPS signal.
Our solution requires the collaboration of a telephone service provider TSP which,
periodically, sends a random RP to all users in a fixed area Q (containing several
microcells) according to the coverage range of the antennas. For each areaQ, a different
RP is sent by TSP and it is important that each microcell is entirely contained in an
area Q, so that two users in the same microcell receive always the same random RP
at the same time. We assume that this service is provided by a unique TSP (to avoid
complex coordination of multiple TSP in overlapping cells), and that the roaming
mechanism can be enabled to ensure the maximum coverage.
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Figure 2: The ZE2-P3T Architecture.
As explained below, RP is used to avoid dictionary-based attacks in order to locate
the position of the user.
To guarantee the privacy, each user Ux, with a certain frequency, generates a
random Rx which is pseudonym identifier valid until a new random is generated.
However, when Rx expires, it is not burnt by Ux, but it is stored for some time.
For each of the two microcells ci where Ux is located, she/he recovers the position
of the centroid Ci of ci and the pair (ρx, θx) which represents the polar coordinates
of the position of Ux respect to Ci. Since the GPS accuracy is not sufficient for
our purpose, when Ux comes in contact with another user, they exchange, through
Bluetooth, their polar coordinates and, according to the position negotiation protocol
described in Section 5, they adjust such coordinates with the purpose to minimize the
error of the mutual distance. At the end of this protocol, Ux obtains the correct pair
(ρx, θx). Note that no pseudo-identifier of Ux is exchanged in the negotiation protocol.
Unlike classic BLE-based solutions, Bluetooth is used only to improve the accuracy
of GPS. Moreover, another advantage of integrate Bluetooth in our solution is the
following. In tradition GPS based solutions, when two users are close but separated
by an obstacle, for example a wall, the server is not aware about this and registers a
contact even if it does not happen. By using Bluetooth, the presence of the obstacle
attenuates the signal and the contact is not captured by the smartphone.
At this point, for the duration of the contact, Ux sends, with frequency
1
τ
, to
a server S (under the control of the health authority) the following information:
(h(Ci||RP ), Rx, ρx, θx), where h denotes a secure cryptographic hash function, RP
is the current random sent by TSP to Ux, Rx is the current random generated by Ux,
and (ρx, θx) are the adjusted polar coordinates of the position of Ux respect to the
centroid Ci.
Clearly, TSP or other entities must not be able to intercept the messages toward
S. Therefore, the communication is encrypted by using the public key of S.
Note that S is not able to recover the exact position of Ux through the relative
coordinates (ρx, θx) because it cannot reverse the hash function in order to obtain the
centroid Ci, thanks to the inclusion of the salt RP . Indeed, without the random RP ,
S can perform a dictionary-based attack by testing all the possible centroids, whose
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number is always feasible for a brute-force attack.
Now, S builds the tuple (h(Ci||RP ), Rx, ρx, θx, τk) where τk = [tk, tk+1] denotes the
k-th time-slot in which the information of U arrives. We use a time slot mechanism
(instead of the absolute time) since two users simultaneously in the same microcell
might not be perfectly synchronized to send their tuples. However, the time slots have
not to be too large to avoid two users which enter in the microcell in different moments
are be treated as they are in microcell simultaneously. We assume that τ = tk+1 − tk
for each k. In word, the size of the time slot is a constant value and coincides with
the inverse of the frequency with which the users send their information to S.
In a later moment, S searches all the tuples with values (h(Ci||RP ), Ry, ρy, θy, τk)
i.e., all the tuples sent by (possible) other users in the same microcell in the same time
slot. Then, it computes, through the (adjusted) polar coordinates, the distance dxy
between the users.
For each of these tuples, S searches, by using (Rx, Ry) as key, an entry in the
contact database with values (Rx, Ry, nxy, Dxy, rxy) where nxy denotes the number of
time-slot in which Ux and Uy came into contact with random Rx, Ry respectively, Dxy
is the set of distances between them (for each the time-slot) and rxy is the partial risk
level computed as function of Dxy and nxy. These entries are called contact bursts
since represent sequences, not necessarily consecutive, of contacts between two users.
If the contact burst between Rx and Ry exists:
1. nxy is increased by one
2. dxy is added to D
3. rxy = f(Dxy, nxy) is recomputed.
, Otherwise (i.e., the contact burst does not exist), the entry (Rx, Ry, n,D, r) is created
with:
1. nxy = 1
2. Dxy containing only dxy
3. rxy = f(Dxy, nxy)
We do not focus on the function for the computation of the partial risk level since
it depends on several medical factors. We can say that the function increases as the
number of time-slot n (i.e., the time interval) in which two users came into contact
increases and it decreases as the distances between users increase. We just remark
that all the information typically used to evaluate the risk in digital contact tracing
solutions are available also in our model.
When a user Uz tested positive for the infection in a health facility HF, she/he may
choose to send her/his randoms to S. In order to avoid fake positive reports, we rely on
a 1024 bits RSA blind signature scheme. As discussed in Section 6, blind signature also
avoids that, even though S colludes with HF, it is not able to link all the randoms of Uz
to her/his real identity. The procedure is the following. First, Uz generates a random
A of 1024-256= 768 bits and obtains M = A||h(A) where h(A) is the application of a
cryptographic hash function with digests of 256 bits (e.g., SHA-256). At this point, Uz
contacts HF to obtain the RSA blind signature on M . Let denote by P the message
with blind signature. Uz unblinds P and obtains the signature of HF σ(M) of M .
Finally, Uz sends to S σ(M) and all the randoms Rzs she/he generated. S verifies
the signature and checks that M = A||h(A). In the positive case, S searches all the
contact burst including any of the randoms Rzs as first or second component. For
each of these entries, S sends in broadcast a pair containing the other random (i.e.,
the random generated by a user which is came into contact with Uz) and the partial
risk level.
Each user Ut receives a set of pairs (Ri, ri) and search the subset of pairs P where
Ri coincides with any of his/her generated randoms Rt. If this subset is empty, Ut has
8
Figure 3: The protocol PNP with r > 0
not encountered any infected users. Otherwise, she/he came into contact one or more
times with one or more users. Finally, the partial risk levels occurring in the pairs of
P are combined together through another function which returns the total risk level
for the user Ut (also the definition of this function is outside the scope of this paper).
5 THE ZE2-P3T POSITION NEGOTIATION
PROTOCOL
In this section, we present a protocol performed by the users to improve the accuracy
of the coordinates captured through the GPS. This protocol involved pairs of users
and is named PNP, which stands for position negotiation protocol. We say that a
user is locked if she/he has executed PNP with another user, otherwise she/he is
unlocked. Consider an unlocked user Ux which enters in the action range of Bluetooth
with a group G of other users. For each locked user Uy in G with polar coordinates
(ρy, θy), Ux retrieves such coordinates through Bluetooth. Since Uy is locked, (ρy, θy)
are already adjusted. On the other hand, the polar coordinates of Ux, (ρx, θx), which
are obtained through GPS, should be adjusted. To accomplish this, Ux computes the
distance dGPS =
√
ρx2 + ρy2 − 2ρxρycos(θx − θy) obtained by considering the non-
adjusted coordinates of Ux. Then, Ux, as typically done on the basis of the signal
power, computes again the distance with Uy. We denote by dBl such a distance and
assume it represents a more accurate estimate of dGPS . Finally, among all (locked)
users, Ux chooses one of the users Uk such that |r| = |dGPS − dBl| is minimum, that
is the user Uk minimizing the error of GPS w.r.t. Bluetooth (which we can consider
more accurate). If we denote by (ρk, θk) the coordinates of Uk, the new coordinates of
Ux, (ρ
′
x, θ
′
x), are obtained by moving the old coordinates by |r| along the straight line
passing between (ρk, θk) and (ρx, θx) so that the new distance between Ux and Uk is
equal to dBl, as depicted in Figure 3. After this process, Ux is locked.
If no locked user exists in the action range of Bluetooth, for each (unlocked) user
Uy, Ux computes dGPS , dBl and r, defined as above, and chooses a user Uk with
minimum value |r|. This time, both Ux and Uk update their coordinates, by moving
them by |r|/2 along the straight line passing between (ρk, θk) and (ρx, θx) so that the
new distance between Ux and Uk is equal to dBl. After this process, both Ux and Uz
are locked.
Note that, as long as a user detect only another (locked or unlocked) user through
Bluetooth, our protocol works well. In fact, even if the adjusted coordinates are
not necessarily correct, the distance between the two users is that measured through
Bluetooth, which is widely considered acceptable for the purpose of proximity tracing.
If more users participate in PNP, we use a greedy approach in order to minimize the
adjusting of the coordinates and to obtain the Bluetooth distance at least with a user.
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Attack Low Cost DP-3T Unlinkable DP-3T ZE2-P3T
Paparazzi 7 3 3
Orwell 7 7 3
Brutus 7 7 3
Gossip 7 7 3
Matteotti 3 7 7
Missile 7 7 3
Fregoli 7 7 3
Battleship 3 3 3
Figure 4: Vulnerabilities of DP-3T and ZE2-P3T to the attacks. The symbol
7 denotes that the solution is vulnerable while the symbol 3 denotes that the
solution resists to the attack.
6 SECURITY ANALYSIS
The claimed robustness of the decentralized solutions like DP-3T mainly relies on the
fact that identities are pseudo-random numbers that, as such, appear unlinkable to
any observer. Unfortunately, this is true unless the seed from which these pseudo-
randoms are generated is not known to the attacker. What makes the linkability of
identifiers a concrete privacy threat is that ephimerals identifiers are not kept only by
the legitimate owner, but are exchanged among all the users. As we will see in detail
in the sequel of the section, the above possibility is realistic in both the designs of
DP-3T (i.e., low-cost and unlinkable), under different attack models. We will show
that our solution is immune from this issue, just because no exchange of identifiers is
enabled.
We analyse in detail the attacks on DP-3T known in the literature and show the
above claim about our technique.
The involved actors of our security model are:
• The users U which send, periodically, their randoms to the server S. If they
find out to be infected, this information is reported to S.
• The server S under the control of the health authority. It receives the randoms
of the users and alerts them when a user communicates she/he is infected.
• The telephone service provider TSP which sends a random RP in a fixed area
with several microcells, in order to prevent the server S to identify the microcell
where a user is located.
• The health facility HF which performs the tests on the users to diagnose the
disease.
The attacker can be a generic entity (for example, a user or a company). We
assume that the health authority and TSP do not collude. Consider that, in a real-
life scenario, a collusion of the health authority with TSP (a private company) would
easily come to light.
In the following, we show how our solution face the attacks discussed in [6] for
which the DP-3T solution is vulnerable plus some other relevant attacks.
We highlight that many attacks are due to the exchange of the ephemeral identifiers
among the users through Bluetooth. In our solution, no random is exchanged.
Paparazzi Attack [6]. The attack aims to trace infected users by linking their
ephemeral identifiers. We assume the server is trusted. This attack works only with
the low-cost design of DP-3T. First, the attacker installs several passive BLE devices
through the territory in order to collect the ephemeral identifiers of other users located
10
in proximity of such devices. Moreover, it records the time and the location where
such identifiers are received and, possibly, other information about the users. When a
user Ux results infected, she/he sends her/his secret key SK to the server S which, in
turn, broadcasts it to all the users. Starting from SK, the attacker is able to generate
all the ephemeral identifiers of Ux and to track her/him through the information (time,
location, etc.) stored when Ux passed in proximity of the passive devices. Clearly, this
attack does not work on the unlinkable design of DP-3T since the infected user Ux
sends the seeds to generate the ephemeral identifiers to the server S, but this latter
does not broadcast such seeds to all users. Instead, S generates all the ephemeral
identifiers of Ux and adds them to the Cuckoo filter, so that the attacker cannot
link them. Similarly, also ZE2-P3T does not suffer of this kind of attack since the
ephemeral identifiers, that are represented by the randoms generated by the users, are
not exchanged, but are sent directly to the server. Since the server is trusted, the
attack cannot be performed.
Orwell Attack [6]. The objective is the same as Paparazzi attack, but with the
difference that the attacker colludes with the server S. Clearly, this time, also the
unlinkable design of DP-3T is vulnerable to the attack since the server S knows the
seeds of the infected users and can easily link their ephemeral identifiers. We claim
that, although, in principle, such an attack is possible in ZE2-P3T, it is definitely
harder and less effective than in DP-3T. In fact, in order to know the randoms of users
coming from a specific microcell, S needs to know the random RP sent by TSP in
that microcell. Since S does not collude with TSP, the only way to obtain RP is to
collaborate with a partner located in the area whenever RP is sent by TSP. To put
on a mass tracking system, the attacker (colluding with the server) must have many
partners spread throughout the territory and each one of them has to be registered
with TSP to obtain RP . Clearly, this is more onerous that to install passive BLE
devices. Moreover, our solution includes in general a certain level of uncertainty,
whenever more than one user belongs to a microcell simultaneously.
Brutus attack. In this attack, the health facility HF and the server S collude to
identify the mapping between pseudonymous and real identities of infected users. It
is an exploit of the authorization mechanism with which infected users communicate
their status to S. DP-3T (both the designs) proposes three different authorization
mechanisms but they are, essentially, based on an authorization code released by HF.
Clearly, HF knows the identity of the infected user and if it colludes with S, then it
may provide to S the mapping between the real identity of a user and its authorization
code. S can associate this identity with the ephemeral identifiers sent by the user. Both
DP-3T designs are vulnerable to this attack. In ZE2-P3T, the authorization code is
replaced by M which cannot be linked by HF to the message submitted by the user
to obtain the signature, thanks to the blind signature mechanism. Thus, both HF
and S cannot link M to the real identity of the user. In conclusion, ZE2-P3T is not
vulnerable to Brutus attack.
Gossip attack [6]. The objective of this attack is to provide an evidence about
an encounter with an infected user before the discovering of her/him positiveness to
the infection. It can be view as a security flaw because it is a misuse of the system
for an unintended scope, potentially threatening privacy and exploitable for disputes.
In both the designs (low-cost and unlinkable) of DP-3T, when the attacker captures
the ephemeral identifiers of other users, she/he could, for example, store them on
blockchain and, successively, demonstrate to have encountered such users. In ZE2-
P3T, this attack is not possible since users do not exchange any random.
Matteotti attack [6]. In this attack, the objective is to deceive a user by providing
her/him a fake contact with a positive user. The result aimed by the attacker is to
damage the victim enforcing her/him quarantine (or other consequent actions). It
requires the collusion of the attacker with the server. Suppose Uv is the user victim
of the attack. In the unlinkable design of DP-3T, the attacker places the BLE passive
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devices in proximity of Uv and when this latter comes into contact with another user
Us, the passive devices capture the ephemeral identifiers of Us and send them to the
server. The server inserts such identifiers in the Cuckoo filter so that, when Uv checks
the filter, she/he is wrongly alerted. Low Cost DP-3T is not vulnerable to this attack
since the server is not able to generate the secret keys of the users starting from the
collected ephemeral identifiers. Similarly to the unlinkable DP-3T, in ZE2-P3T, the
server can notify false information about the contacts at risk.
Another attack with the same objective as the Matteotti attack is the following.
It does not require the collusion with the server.
Missile attack. The objective of this attack is the same of the Matteotti attack.
In this case, the attacker is a user who is positive to the disease. She/He can use a
Bluetooth amplifier transmitter to send his/her ephemeral identifiers (like a missile)
to other users even very distant from her/him and so, not at risk. However, when the
server communicates the infected identifiers of the attacker, such users are wrongly
alerted. The attack is based on the exchange of the ephemeral identifiers through
Bluetooth, so both the designs of DP-3T are vulnerable. On the contrary, ZE2-P3T
does not suffer from this attack since no identifier is exchanged through Bluetooth.
Another possible attack is the following.
Fregoli attack. This attack aims to simulate fake contacts between users. The
attacker can collect the ephemeral identifiers of the users and use them in place of
his/her own. This is then an impersonation attack, as its name evokes, being Fregoli
one of the major quick-change artists of the story. The result of the impersonation is
that a user Ux keeps ephemeral identifiers of other users with which she/he never met.
If any of them results infected, Ux is wrongly alerted as in the Matteotti attack. This
attack is more effective if the attacker uses a Bluetooth amplifier transmitter. Again,
this attack is possible in both the designs of DP-3T but it is not possible in ZE2 -P3T
since no random is exchanged through Bluetooth.
Finally, we conclude the analysis by presenting another attack which, potentially,
affects GPS-based approaches.
Battleship attack. In this attack, the server tries to identify the position of the users
to track them. In both the designs of DP-3T, such an attack is not possible since no
information about the position is sent to S. On the contrary, any standard GPS-based
solution is affected by this problem. Therefore, it is important to check what happens
for our protocol. In ZE2-P3T, the user sends the polar coordinates relative to a given
centroid Ci. Therefore, the attack would succeed if the server is able to identify such
centroid. The user sends h(Ci||RP ) and, even if the total number of centroids is not
too large, the presence of the random RP makes dictionary-based attacks unfeasible.
Since S and TSP do not collude, the only way for S would be to collaborate with a
partner physically located in a microcell in order to obtain RP . As explained in Orwell
Attack, to put on a mass tracking system is infeasible.
We highlight that, although the attacks regard DP-3T, they shall also apply to oth-
ers decentralized protocols [14, 24, 25] since the vulnerabilities are due to the exchange
of the ephemeral identifiers.
Finally, we observe that, being our approach centralized, the intrinsic price we
have to pay in terms of privacy is that, once an infected patient sends to the server
her/him randoms used in the contagious window, the server links this randoms (this
is obviously necessary in the centralized model), learning some piece of pseudonym
information about the user. We argue that as the match between real identities and
pseudonyms is not possible even in case of collusion between HF and server (see Brutus
attack above), this is not an actual threat to privacy, against the evident benefits given
by our approach summarized in the table reported in Figure 4.
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7 CONCLUSIONS
The fight against the pandemic of COVID-19 requires a number of coordinated actions
that governments should take promptly. Among these, digital contact tracing has
an important role, especially during the after-lock-down phase, in which potential
infected people should be rapidly identified and isolated. The main contribution of this
paper is to show that a centralized approach, exploiting GPS, can provide a solution
definitely more effective, in terms of security and privacy protection, than decentralized
solutions based on DP-3T or similar protocols. Unlike similar attempts occurring in the
current literature, our solution does not rely on complex cryptographic mechanisms
to avoid people position tracking, but only efficient cryptographic hashes and RSA
blind signatures only for the reporting phase. As a future work we plan to implement
the solution also by detailing the combination of existing technologies based on the
Earth magnetic field to improve the indoor localization accuracy. Another direction
of further extension of this paper regards a more accurate (tested) definition of the
function estimating the contagious risk, which is a task inherently interdisciplinary,
outside the scope of this paper, aimed to rapidly share this new approach with the
scientific community (also by publication in open-access pre-print archives), being the
topic of high interest in the current days.
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